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Leading public figures have put forth strong positions about the general conditions under which 
it makes sense for a person to choose to die rather than to go on living and when it makes sense 
instead to go on living. These views run the gamut, from Ezekiel Emmanuel’s view that it is un-
reasonable (for just about anyone) to engage in extensive life-saving measures after age 75 to Atul 
Gawande’s dictum that it is “always possible to find beauty or meaning in what’s left” (Emman-
uel 2014, Gawande 2015).  By contrast, I share with Frances Kamm the general orientation that 
there is nothing quite so idiomatic and generalizable to say about the matter. 
     In Almost Over: Aging, Dying, Dead, Frances Kamm embraces a humane middle position that 
seeks to make sense of (and to some degree, vindicate) people’s widely variant choices about 
which lives they would choose to continue living (Kamm 2020). While much of the book consists 
of criticism of different overly generalized positions, she also puts forth a principle to support her 
conclusions that she calls the Prudential Prerogative. In analogy to the Moral Prerogative that she 
argues for elsewhere, which supports the permissibility of engaging in personal projects in lieu 
of spending all of one’s time volunteering, the Prudential Prerogative holds that in a fairly wide 
range of conditions we are under no intrapersonal rational obligation to choose either to die or to 
live on. According to Kamm, there is often sufficient reason to either live on or to die (and thus 
no decisive reason for or against living on) even when that choice is in tension with living the 
best life that one could live.  
     The Prudential Prerogative stands in contrast to two competing views about when it is and is 
not reasonable to choose for your life to end: 
 
Additivism: It doesn’t make sense to choose for your life to end unless the sum of goods 
(taking into account degree) left in your life minus the sum of bads (taking into account 
degree) is negative.1 
 
Life Holism: It doesn’t make sense to choose for your life to end unless the life you would 
have if you end it now is better than the life you would have had if you lived on, when 
the two lives are considered as wholes.2 
 
The Prudential Prerogative holds, by contrast, that it can make sense to end your life even if nei-
ther of these circumstances are the case. There is, instead, a different set of principles governing 
the bounds of which lives one has sufficient prudential reason to choose to end: 
 
 
1 Kamm refers to this as the method that Shelly Kagan favors in Kagan 2012. 
2 As Kamm notes, Kagan 2012, pp. 368 mentions but does not necessarily endorse this alternative view. 
She also attributes something like this view to Ronald Dworkin in Dworkin 1993. 
 
1. Only very serious personal costs can stand in the way of getting a greater good for 
oneself (Kamm 2020, pp. 46). So, it does not make sense to choose to die in order to avoid 
having a relatively minor outpatient surgery. 
 
2. It is not just that there is some threshold severity of badness that makes it unreasonable 
to go on, because it can be reasonable to undergo a significant period of torture in hell to 
gain eternal life with God. (Kamm 2020, pp. 47).  In order to decide whether it is worth 
living through some amount of pain, you must consider not only the degree of the bad 
you’ll endure but also how good the payoff is for living through it, in ratio to each other. 
The ratio must be great enough to make it reasonable. 
 
3. While it would be unreasonable to refuse to currently suffer some amount of bad to 
forego a greater future bad, it is not similarly unreasonable to refuse to suffer a significant 
bad that is bundled with a great amount of good (Kamm 2020, pp. 47). So, whereas you 
are rationally required to choose the moderately painful death that would happen now 
over the excruciatingly painful death that would happen a few minutes from now, you 
are not required to endure something similarly painful in order to stay alive to get further 
goods.  
 
Within these bounds, that are here roughly gestured at, you are prudentially justified in deciding 
to end your life or deciding to continue on, even when doing so is at odds with what it would 
take to make it true that you had lived a better life. 
     While I agree with Kamm that Additivism is false, I find her Prudential Prerogative to be un-
motivated. In this article I will do two things. First, I’ll show that in terms of life or death cases, 
Life Holism fares at least as well as the Prudential Prerogative in its ability to capture the norma-
tive phenomena that Kamm is interested in. Next, I’ll argue that the features of the Moral Prerog-
ative that make it an attractive principle do not transfer to the Prudential Prerogative. Kamm’s 




1. Life Holism, the Prudential Prerogative, and Individualized Choices  
 
The heart of Kamm’s view, I take it, is this: people can have different perspectives on what is and 
is not worth living for and one person’s perspective is not necessarily more reasonable than the 
next. Kamm uses the Prudential Prerogative to support, for example, the view that people can 
vary fairly widely in the amount of suffering they are or are not willing to endure to accrue future 
benefits while remaining reasonable from a prudential perspective, (Kamm 2020, Ch. 2).  She also 
argues that it is not unreasonable to choose to live on in old age only if one will have access to 
future goods that will provide meaning in one’s life, and it is not unreasonable to choose to live 
on without them (Kamm 2020, Ch. 6). The reason that there are different responses to this situa-
tion that would be justified is, I take it, that it is just a matter of whether or not the person happens 
to care about their future having goods that will provide meaning in their life or not. 
     Notice, though, that one does not need to adopt the Prudential Prerogative in order to accom-
modate this perspective. Life Holism can also hold that for some people a life that ends with a 
period devoid of meaningful pursuits will be worse than a life that ends before such a period 
occurs, but for some people the reverse is true. Life Holism can also hold that suffering has dif-
ferent value in different lives; perhaps the suffering of a martyr contributes to the value of her life 
in a different way than the suffering of a cancer patient. Given Life Holism you can have two 
cases in which the rough description of the choice situation is the same but you end up with two 
different answers to whether or not the person ought prudentially to continue living because the 
case lacks relevant facts about the person as an individual. 
      Take, for example, the following set of cases: 
 
Amani is an 80-year-old woman who has an injury that is painless but will prove rapidly 
fatal if she does not undergo a particular operation. While the operation is proven to be 
100% successful, it involves a lengthy and excruciatingly painful recovery period. Her life 
is otherwise going very well, and she is sure to have 10 years of reasonably blissful and 
meaningful existence post-recovery. 
 
Beatriz is another 80-year-old woman who faces the same circumstances as Amani; she 
too faces the choice of whether or not to undergo the surgery given the choice between 
letting the injury take its course, or undergoing a period of excruciating pain followed by 
ten great years. 
 
The Additivist must conclude that Amani and Beatriz either both have decisive prudential reason 
to undergo the surgery or both have decisive prudential reason to refuse, determined exclusively 
by just how good those ten years will be and whether that goodness outweighs the amount of 
badness incurred during the recovery period. The Life Holist, however, can be open to the possi-
bility that Amani has decisive prudential reason to undergo the surgery and Beatriz has decisive 
prudential reason to refuse (keeping all of the facts about the recovery period and the following 
decade the same) given differences about what makes for the better overall life for them as indi-
viduals.  
     Perhaps Amani’s life has been full of trials and tribulations. She is ready to take on her next 
challenge, and facing this operation bravely fits with her conception of herself and of the life she 
is meant to live. She doesn’t derive any additional source of pleasure from this, but rather, simply 
sees this as a fitting next stage of her life.  Beatriz, on the other hand, we can imagine, has always 
intentionally arranged her life first and foremost so as to avoid discomfort. Her parents were 
migrant laborers who physically toiled to provide for a comfortable life for her, and she has come 
to embody this destiny. One of the ways that Beatriz honors her parents and her sense of self is 
by maintaining a peaceful and pleasant life of simple pleasures with no great obstacles to over-
come. To now undertake this surgery would, for her, be a betrayal of her deeply felt priorities 
and the project of living that has provided the scaffolding of her life story. The Life Holist can 
hold, in one sense, that people can vary fairly widely in the amount of suffering they are or are 
not willing to endure to accrue future benefits while remaining reasonable from a prudential per-
spective. But, the Life Holist will claim, there is some sort of explanation available as to which 
option, for that person, will make the most sense, from the perspective of what makes for the best 
life that that individual person can have. So, while people differ widely from each other as to 
what amount of suffering is worth it for themselves, there is still a correct answer for each indi-
vidual, taking into account the kind of life that is best for them. 
     Kamm’s Prudential Principle goes further in claiming that it doesn’t need to matter to Beatriz 
or Amani’s deliberation which overall life would be better. Given that the ratio between the bliss-
fulness of the ten years and the painfulness of the recovery is in the right range, neither Amani 
nor Beatriz has decisive prudential reason to choose either way, even if their choices are in direct 
conflict with living the lives that would be best for them as individuals.  
     While it’s a benefit of a view that it can accommodate the fact that Beatriz and Amani can both 
be fully justified in their decisions of whether or not to undergo the surgery while coming to 
opposite conclusions, I do not see how it is a further benefit to say that either of them could choose 
against the option that would lead to the best life for them while remaining justified in their 
choice. Notice that Amani can ask the question In the long run is the best thing for me to do to get the 
surgery? and have the answer be Yes. So you would think that what Amani ought to do is to get 
the surgery, but Kamm says that (so long as the painful recovery period is at least painful to some 
reasonable degree relative to the goodness of the following ten years) Amani would nevertheless 
have sufficient reason to not get the surgery. This is a strange implication; what kind of reason is 
it to make your choice if it’s not coming from what your prudentially best option is?  
     Kamm says in a footnote (Kamm 2020, pp. 53, fn 28) that Kieran Setiya has suggested that the 
Prudential Principle is in tension with the buck-passing view of goodness, according to which 
saying that something would maximize the good in one’s life means that there is the most reason 
to choose it.3 Kamm suggests that this tension may not exist, but if it does, she thinks, so much 
the worse then for the buck-passing view But the Prudential Principle seems to be in conflict not 
just with a certain account of reasons, but also with the common-sensical intuition that the buck-
passing account aims to explain by giving an analysis of goodness in terms of reasons: namely, 
that we ought to do things that are good for us, and if something else would be even better then 
we ought to do that instead. In severing the tight connection between goodness and reasons, 
Kamm’s view is not only in tension with the buck-passing view, but also the main rival view that 
goodness is fundamental and reasons are explicable in terms of goodness. Life Holism need not 
be construed as having the same tension. The fittingness of undergoing the surgery for Amani’s 
life story, and the fittingness of refusing the surgery for Beatriz’s life story may be construed as 
goods for these respective agents that make their different life paths most choiceworthy.4 Thus 
the Life Holist can claim that maximizing the goodness of one’s life will always be consistent with 
what one has the most reason to do (when considering only one’s own interests.) But, neverthe-
less, one’s own good can be maximized by goods that are only available to a person as an indi-
vidual with all of her particularities. If it is possible to capture the important results Kamm aims 
 
3 For a (critical) overview of buck-passing accounts of prudential goodness see Fletcher 2012. 
4 Since Beatriz’s refusal of the surgery is, in effect, a choice to become non-existent, there are open ques-
tions about when exactly, the good of the fittingness of this ending is meant to accrue. Here, the Life Ho-
list can perhaps offer a kind of partners-in-crime defense; whatever the right answer is as to when the 
badness of death would accrue to Amani were she to refuse the surgery can also explain when the good-
ness of Beatriz’s death accrues to her. 
to explain by reference to the Prudential Principle without having to take recourse to a principle 
that betrays this seeming truism that goodness and reasons have a tight connection, then we 
should try to do that. 
     Suppose now that the injury Amani and Beatriz are suffering from is a kind of injury that 
painlessly makes a person slip into a coma until the surgery can be performed. Instead of being 
faced with the choice of whether or not to undergo the surgery themselves, their loved ones are 
instead faced with making the choice on their behalf. Their loved ones, let’s suppose, want to act 
in accordance with Amani and Beatriz’s reasons, not on their own self-interested reasons. Ac-
cording to Kamm’s picture, it seems as though both women’s loved ones have sufficient reason 
to choose to either subject them to the surgery or not. What’s strange here is that Kamm wouldn’t  
want to deny that there is a fact of the matter about whether or not the surgery would be the best 
for Amani and Beatriz with regards to what is good for them in the sense that it is leads to the 
best possible life for them. But their loved ones, it would seem, need not take this into considera-
tion, since the facts that justify either choice are just the ratio of the degree of harm that will be 
caused by the recovery period in proportion to the goodness of the years to follow. These reasons, 
unlike the reasons that make one life course better or worse for Amani or Beatriz in particular, 
seem strangely impersonal, and non-specific to the individuals in question. In this way, Life Ho-
lism actually seems able to do better in terms of taking into account the perspectival interests of 
Amani and Beatriz; it predicts that Amani’s loved ones ought to elect the surgery and Beatriz’s 
loved ones ought to refuse it on her behalf. 
     Kamm also goes on the offensive against Life Holism, writing that “there is no duty fulfilled, 
or even virtue in, maximizing the overall goodness of one’s life, let alone by sacrificing what 
would give one a good enough future” (Kamm 2020, pp. 175).  On the face of it, this does seem 
concerning. Why should acting according to your prudential reasons ever require (rather than 
merely allow) sacrificing your good future? I want to suggest that the sting of this criticism can 
be alleviated by adopting a form of Life Holism that has a subjectivist component.  
     To illustrate, let’s examine what Kamm says about the following case: 
What if additional life would be deeply “inconsistent” with previous life or with past cur-
rent reasonable values but it would be just as good or even a better life according to dif-
ferent reasonable values? (An example might be being an esthete and then being a monk.) 
This could yield an entire life with no connectedness between its past and its future. I do 
not think that continuing in such a life is necessarily worse than nothing for a person even 
though judged as a whole it may seem odd. I don’t think it is necessarily senseless to 
choose such a life or to choose death in the absence of sufficient connectedness. There 
could be sufficient (just not decisive) reason to do either (Kamm 2020, pp. 44).   
Now, one way to be a Life Holist is to claim that the narrative coherence of one’s life overall, or 
the fact that a person has an upward sloping trajectory rather than a downward sloping trajectory, 
are additional quite weighty objective goods that can outweigh momentary objective goods like 
pleasure.5 If we suppose, for the sake of argument, that the life of the monk involves only a small 
amount of pleasure, then Kamm’s criticism makes sense here.  It seems that this kind of Life Holist 
cannot say that it makes sense for the esthete to live on if his only option for doing so is to become 
a monk, given the fact that he would miss out on the great good of having a narratively coherent 
life.  
     But another (and, I think, a preferable) way to be a Life Holist is to claim that there is more 
value in a person living the lives that she would prefer to live if she were suitably idealized when 
ranking her possibilities.6 This introduces at least some subjective component that ties the norma-
tivity of prudential reasons to what one cares about. When suitably idealized it may be that the 
esthete prefers the extended life with the monastic final chapter over the shorter life, or it may be 
that his preferences are the other way around. The Life Holist in this way can agree that it is not 
necessarily senseless to choose the longer life or to choose death in the absence of sufficient con-
nectedness. But, in doing so, she need not hold that one and the same individual has sufficient 
reason to either live on or not to. It may be that in most cases the person prudentially ought to 
continue on as a monk because most people would prefer to have a life with the monastic pleas-
ures in it to one with the narrative coherence. Or, they might even find enough of value in in the 
overarching narrative of a person who was once an esthete but then became a monk to recom-
mend it. The only cases in which the person prudentially ought to choose against living on as a 
monk are cases in which he, when suitably idealized, would find living out one final chapter of 
life as a monk not worth it, given just how strongly he prefers the coherent life of the esthete. So, 
in these cases if the man were to ask why he ought to end his life and not continue on as a monk, 
the Life Holist can respond as follows: if you could really appreciate what each of these potential 
paths would mean for you, you’d see that it’s not really worth it to you. It is this that makes 
choosing to go on not just non-obligatory but actually an unreasonable choice. 
 
 
5 This kind of Objectivist Life Holist could also hold that a high concentration of bads in a short amount of 
time can constitute a reason to disprefer a certain life above and beyond the reasons given by the sum of 
the individual bads. One version of this view would hold that sums of bads and goods can contribute to 
the goodness of a life as well as the distribution of those goods and bads across the span of the life. This 
accords with the views Kamm attributes to Temkin (Temkin 2012; Kamm 2020, pp.54, fn 39). 
6 A natural question arises here as to which preference set of the agent we are to idealize from, given that 
agents’ preferences are in constant flux. Here we might take a page from Phil Bricker who holds that the 
calculation of what constitutes the most prudent life a person can live must be determined from the 
standpoint of their own concept of the good. He suggests the following: “…a theory of prudence must be 
able to arbitrate the competing claims of past, present, and future selves. Different acts would be recom-
mended as best by different selves; if a theory of prudence is to be able to direct the agent to do that act 
which is best, not for this self or that self, but for the agent timelessly considered, it must provide a 
method for amalgamating the various preference rankings of the earlier and later, selves into a single, 
timeless preference ranking. The resulting system of preferences may not coincide with any actual system 
of preferences that the agent has had at any time; in this sense it provides an abstract and artificial per-
spective. But it provides the perspective from which the agent would wish to view his life if he were, at 
any time, motivated to perform the most prudent act, the act that would contribute the most to his life 
overall” (Bricker 1980). 
 
 
2. Moral and Prudential Prerogatives 
 
Kamm’s support for the Prudential Prerogative comes in part from her support for what Scheffler 
first termed the Moral Prerogative (Scheffler 1994). The moral prerogative can explain why one 
is permitted to go on a bicycle ride on a particular morning rather than volunteering to help the 
homeless. Moral prerogatives, according to Kamm, “permit an agent to (1) act in ways that do 
not maximize the impartial good, and (2) act for reasons that stem from his personal perspective, 
rather than from the perspective of an impartial judge”(Kamm 2006, pp. 15). So, the fundamental 
features of the prerogative are that it is non-maximizing, and perspectival.  
     In the prudential case, though, arguing that we are permitted to be partial non-maximizers 
won’t do much to motivate the Prudential Prerogative over Life Holism. Prudential reasons, ac-
cording to Life Holism, are already perspectival, and in at least some sense, non-maximizing. 
They are perspectival in that they take into account what makes sense for a person in particular to 
do, given their own values. They are non-maximizing as they allow for holistic values like the 
value of a particular life-narrative to trump lives with higher additive value. While the life holist 
is committed to thinking that a person ought to pick the potential life with the best ‘score,’ the 
score cannot be predicted by summing amounts of impartial goods contained within the life. It is 
consistent with life holism, for example, that a life composed entirely of components that have no 
value on their own may be the best only because all of the components hang together just so.  
     One natural way of making sense of the Moral Prerogative is to hold that prudential reasons 
can compete with moral reasons. We are justified in engaging in our personal projects that fail to 
maximize impartial good because there is some ratio at which the strength of our prudential rea-
son competes with the strength of the moral reason enough that it may take precedence. But when 
we move from thinking about a moral prerogative to a prudential prerogative, it is unclear what 
kinds of reasons are meant to play the competing role. Prudential reasons are already perspec-
tival—whereas impartial moral reasons can perhaps be defeated due to other worthy things you 
might aspire towards, it is hard to see how there could be self-focused worthy things that you 
would be justified in doing that are not prudentially good for you. If you want to go on a bicycle 
ride and you’re justified in doing it, what reasons could there be to support it that are neither 
moral nor prudential reasons? Any plausible candidate, it would seem, would be subsumed un-
der the realm of prudential reasons because anything you are justified in doing for your own 
benefit would be something that is good for you. This picture of competing kinds of reasons that 
can make sense of the Moral Prerogative, it would seem, does not easily transfer to a way of 
making sense of the Prudential Prerogative. 
     One suggestion that might seem to help could be the idea that it is not the competing reasons 
themselves which have value, but rather, the value lies in having the autonomy to make choices 
that conflict with what is prudentially best for oneself. In the case of the Moral Prerogative Kamm 
writes: 
It seems…reasonable for the multiplicative factor to depend on the relative importance of 
the project to the agent, and even to permit the agent to give fundamental projects lexical 
priority relative to the impartial good. Even this seems an imperfect characterization, since 
a true prerogative gives the agent the option to care less for himself than for others, and 
this does not seem to be captured by a multiplicative factor greater than one. This is a 
reason to think that the prerogative represents a concern for one’s autonomy rather than 
for the importance of one’s own project from one’s own perspective, relative to the inter-
ests of other (Kamm 2006, pp. 16). 
Can we give a similar account in the case of the Prudential Prerogative? For the sake of argument, 
I think that we can grant that this kind of autonomy might be important to value when we’re 
setting policy about end-of-life decisions; there’s something important, perhaps, about not being 
paternalistic and allowing people to have choices even when they may choose against their own 
interest. But it doesn’t follow from this that we ought to see these choices as being justified. I 
doubt that autonomy can undergird a story about how a person can be justified in choosing 
against what would be, for her, her best possible life. The problem is that autonomy involves the 
exercise of a certain kind of self-directed freedom from an external perspective. But what is the 
perspective, in this case, from which the view of what’s best for that person is external? Or, to put 
the point differently, who, exactly, is claiming freedom from the self?  
     The only candidate, it would seem, would be a particular person stage. This raises concerns 
that the freedom sought from the whole self by a person stage is really just a time bias masquer-
ading as a form of intrapersonal rationality. As Kamm argues, though, the Prudential Prerogative 
does not depend on taking a temporally nonneutral perspective on the future in the sense that it 
merely allows you to favor avoiding the bads you currently face at the cost of what will be good 
for you in the future. She has us consider the life represented in the following figure: 
 
Figure 1. (Kagan 2012, pp. 329) 
Suppose the last time you are able to end your life is at Q. Kamm says that the Prudential Pre-
rogative could justify the choice to end your life at Q on the basis of not wanting your later self 
to suffer the bads of the period of time between C and D. She concludes that 
… the Prudential Prerogative is consistent with temporal neutrality toward the future 
and depends on sometimes giving priority to avoiding the worst in the future rather 
than to having the best. It implies that it could be consistent with rationality not to allow 
one’s future life to go below a certain level for the sake of even some greater future 
goods…(Kamm 2020, pp. 8). 
I agree with Kamm that the Prudential Prerogative doesn’t violate temporal neutrality in the 
sense that it doesn’t rely on taking the perspective that you ought to favor your current situation. 
However, assuming the entire life represented in the chart is a better life than one that ends at Q, 
the view does seem to hold that it can be intrapersonally rational to favor the good of a certain 
person stage (not necessarily the one you are now) over the good of the person as a whole. You 
can show favoritism to any of several person stages, even when, from the view of your life overall, 
doing so doesn’t make your life better in any way. This, to me, seems like at least some form of 
temporal non-neutrality. While nothing I have said is a knockdown argument against the possi-
bility that our intrapersonal rationality does nevertheless respect the value of this kind of auton-
omy, justifying our choices made on its basis, it is certainly not intuitive that we have (or would 
even have reason to want) this kind of autonomy. 
     Kamm says that the Moral Prerogative “can be seen as a by-product of the fact that moral 
obligation is not about producing as much good as possible. It is about respect for persons and 
doing as much good as that requires” (Kamm 2006, pp. 16-17). This line of thought is appealing. 
I would argue that prudential rationality, likewise, is not about producing the greatest sum of 
momentary prudential goods as possible but is rather about respect for oneself as a person. Re-
spect for yourself as a person, though, just is aspiring to live your best life. This is reason to favor 
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